stride-analysis-patterns
用 STRIDE 方法論有系統地找出系統威脅，做威脅建模
中文翻譯
---
name: stride-analysis-patterns
description: 套用 STRIDE 方法論來有系統地找出威脅。在分析系統安全、進行威脅建模討論，或建立安全文件時使用。
---
# STRIDE Analysis Patterns
用 STRIDE 方法論有系統地找出威脅。
## When to Use This Skill
- 開始新的威脅建模討論
- 分析既有的系統架構
- 檢視安全設計的決策
- 建立威脅文件
- 訓練團隊辨識威脅
- 合規與稽核準備
## Core Concepts
### 1. STRIDE Categories
```
S - Spoofing → Authentication threats
T - Tampering → Integrity threats
R - Repudiation → Non-repudiation threats
I - Information → Confidentiality threats
Disclosure
D - Denial of → Availability threats
Service
E - Elevation of → Authorization threats
Privilege
```
### 2. Threat Analysis Matrix
| Category | Question | Control Family |
| ------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | -------------- |
| **Spoofing** | 攻擊者能假冒別人嗎？ | Authentication |
| **Tampering** | 攻擊者能修改傳輸中/靜態的資料嗎？ | Integrity |
| **Repudiation** | 攻擊者能否認自己做過的動作嗎？ | Logging/Audit |
| **Info Disclosure** | 攻擊者能存取未授權的資料嗎？ | Encryption |
| **DoS** | 攻擊者能破壞可用性嗎？ | Rate limiting |
| **Elevation** | 攻擊者能取得更高的權限嗎？ | Authorization |
## Templates and detailed worked examples
完整的範本庫放在 `references/details.md`。需要這個 skill 的具體範本時，再去讀那個檔案。
## Best Practices
### Do's
- **讓利害關係人參與** - 安全、開發和維運的觀點都要有
- **要有系統** - 涵蓋所有 STRIDE 類別
- **務實地排優先順序** - 專注在高衝擊的威脅
- **定期更新** - 威脅模型是活的文件
- **用視覺化輔助** - DFD 有助於溝通
### Don'ts
- **不要跳過任何類別** - 每一類都會揭露不同的威脅
- **不要假設是安全的** - 質疑每一個元件
- **不要閉門造車** - 協作式建模比較好
- **不要忽略低機率的威脅** - 高衝擊的威脅很重要
- **不要停在找出威脅** - 要接著做緩解措施英文原文
---
name: stride-analysis-patterns
description: Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.
---
# STRIDE Analysis Patterns
Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.
## When to Use This Skill
- Starting new threat modeling sessions
- Analyzing existing system architecture
- Reviewing security design decisions
- Creating threat documentation
- Training teams on threat identification
- Compliance and audit preparation
## Core Concepts
### 1. STRIDE Categories
```
S - Spoofing → Authentication threats
T - Tampering → Integrity threats
R - Repudiation → Non-repudiation threats
I - Information → Confidentiality threats
Disclosure
D - Denial of → Availability threats
Service
E - Elevation of → Authorization threats
Privilege
```
### 2. Threat Analysis Matrix
| Category | Question | Control Family |
| ------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | -------------- |
| **Spoofing** | Can attacker pretend to be someone else? | Authentication |
| **Tampering** | Can attacker modify data in transit/rest? | Integrity |
| **Repudiation** | Can attacker deny actions? | Logging/Audit |
| **Info Disclosure** | Can attacker access unauthorized data? | Encryption |
| **DoS** | Can attacker disrupt availability? | Rate limiting |
| **Elevation** | Can attacker gain higher privileges? | Authorization |
## Templates and detailed worked examples
Full template library lives in `references/details.md`. Read that file when you need concrete templates for this skill.
## Best Practices
### Do's
- **Involve stakeholders** - Security, dev, and ops perspectives
- **Be systematic** - Cover all STRIDE categories
- **Prioritize realistically** - Focus on high-impact threats
- **Update regularly** - Threat models are living documents
- **Use visual aids** - DFDs help communication
### Don'ts
- **Don't skip categories** - Each reveals different threats
- **Don't assume security** - Question every component
- **Don't work in isolation** - Collaborative modeling is better
- **Don't ignore low-probability** - High-impact threats matter
- **Don't stop at identification** - Follow through with mitigations